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Abstract. Today millions of ordinary citizens are using networks for banking, shopping and filing their tax return. 
Network security has become a massive problem. All this requires network to identify its legal users for providing 
services. An authentication protocol used is Kerberos which uses strong secret key for user authentication but it is 
vulnerable in case of weak passwords. Authentication  & key distribution protocols requires sharing secret key(s) with 
a view that only the concerned users know to derive the information from it. These protocols are vulnerable to key 
guessing attacks. Another important consideration is perfect forward secrecy in which our proposed scheme cover 
cases with application servers, authentication servers or clients key are revealed & their combination. In this paper our 
proposed scheme deal with key guessing attacks, perfect forward secrecy and protocols for few combinations of keys. 
All these protocols are based on the fact that the keys are weak & can be exploited easily. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Network security problems can be divided roughly into four areas: Secrecy, authentication, non repudiation, & 
integrity control.  Authentication deals with determining whom you are talking to before revealing sensitive 
information or entering into a business deal. 
In recent years, a variety of protocols for authentication and key distribution have been proposed and applied to many  
communication system. Diffie and Hellman described how to establish a common session key by public messages. In 
[7], Needham et al. proposed a key distribution center that used encryption too. An  authentication protocol used in 
many real systems which is based on a variant of Kerberos [6]. However, it is vulnerable in case of weak passwords. In 
this paper our proposed scheme focused on environment with weak keys and focus on key  covering attacks and also 
perfect forward secrecy (PFS) which ensures that a session key derived from a set of long- term public & private keys 
will not be compromised if one of the private keys is compromised in the future[3].The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows section 2 summaries the description of notation & security requirements. Section 4 presents a 
protocol for class -3PFS. Remaining section deals with class-7 PFS. 
 
 
NOTATION & SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
  
Table 1. Notations 
 
U                        User 
AS                      Application server 
AU                     Authentication server 
PAU                     Key shared between U and AU 
SAS                     Secret key shared between AS and AU 
KS                      Public key of AU 
x, y, a, b, c, d      Random numbers 
h( )                      hash function 
U→AS : M          U sends a message M to AS 
g                          Base generator 
P                          Large prime (P is the modulus of all  Modular exponentiations) 
[data]K                          Symmetric encryption of “data” with commom  key K 
[data]K                Asymmetric encryption of “data” with  common  key K 
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Key Guessing attacks:  
This type of attacks can take place both in offline as well as online mode. In online mode the authentication servers 
can detect such an attack by noticing continuous authentication failures[5]. In offline mode, an attacker eavesdrop 
communication messages during a protocol & stores them, then tries to find out the our weak password by verifying a 
password with the information stored. 
 
Replay Attacks: 
In this  the data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the 
originator or by an adversary as part of the data  &  propagates it possibly as part of a masquerade  attack  by  IP  Pack  
substitution.  
 
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) 
It is a property that ensures that a session key derived from a set of long term public & private keys will not be 
compromised if one of the private keys is compromised in the future. Based on the capability of protecting the client’s 
password, the application server’s secret key, and the authentication server’s private key[2].Seven Classes of Perfect 
forward secrecy based on clients, application server and authentication server are as given below. 
 
Class1 PFS 
It provides low security because in this clients key is revealed to an attacker but still it does not help in obtaining the 
session keys of previous session, but the application server’s secret key and the authentication server’s private key is 
still secure. 
 
Class 2 PFS 
In this only application server key is revealed to the attacker  where as authentication servers and clients password are 
revealed to the attacker[3] which makes it impossible to obtain the  keys of the previous session. 
 
Class 3 PFS  and Class 4 PFS 
In  Class-3 protocol only the authentication server key is secure but the other keys are revealed  to the attacker  still the 
attacker can not obtain the sessions keys of previous session. In Class-4 Protocol the authentication servers key is 
revealed to the attacker[4], rest of the keys are secured which makes it a little vulnerable to attack but is still secured 
enough. 
 
Class 5 ,Class 6  and Class 7 PFS’s  
In Class 5 and Class 6 application servers and clients key are secured respectively ,due to which both are vulnerable to 
attack . A class providing class 7 PFS means that if the clients key, authentication  servers  and application servers key 
are simultaneously revealed to an attacker, this protocol is highly secure it will not help the attacker in obtaining the 
keys of the previous sessions. 
 
 
A PROTOCOL FOR CLASS 1 PFS 
 
An efficient authentication and key distribution protocol providing class-1 PFS is proposed in this section. There are 
three principals involved in our protocol: an application server AS who provides services to clients, a client U who 
requests services from the application server, and an authentication server AU who is responsible for authentication 
and who distributes the common session key shared between the client U and the application server AU. 
 
In this protocol, our proposed scheme assume that all principals know the server’s public key KS in the system. We 
also assume that a poorly chosen password PAU chosen by A(client) is known to S(server) via a secure channel [3]. 
Similarly, the application server’s secret key SAS is known to AU via a secure channel. 
Our proposed protocol shown in Fig. 1 and the detailed steps are described as follows: 
 
(1) U→AU : U,{U,AS ,PAU, z}KS : 
A chooses a random number z and keeps it secret. Then, A encrypts user’s password ,AS, PAU, z, with server S’s 
public key KS and transmits the encrypted message as a request to S, where PAU is the password of A. 
 
(2) AU→AS: U,[U,AS, [U,K]z, K]SAS : 
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After receiving client A’s message, the authentication server, AU, decrypts {U,AS,,PAU, z}KS with his private key 
 
U                                                     AU                                      AS 
U,{U,AS,PAU, Z}Ks 
 
  U,[U,AS, [U,K]Z,K]SAS   
 
     [U,K]z , [As ,b]K 
    
 
                                    h 
  
Fig. 1. A protocol providing PFS with low security 
 
corresponding to the public key KS and checks the authenticity of U by verifying AU’s password PAU. Then, he 
chooses a common key K. Hence, he can compute [U,AS, [U,K]z, K]SAS , and transmit it to AS. Note that the value z 
also acts as a one-time key. 
 
(3) AS →U: [U,K]Z, [AS ,b]K: 
The application server AS first decrypts the message [U,AS, [U,K]z ,K]SB with his secret key SAS and gets the 
common key K. Then AS chooses a challenge value b, encrypts AS and b with the common key K, and sends [U,K]z 
and [AS ,b]K to the user U. 
 
(4) U→AS: b: 
In step 4, the user A decrypts message [U,K]z with z and gets the common key K. Then, he decrypts [As ,b]K, checks 
the validity of K, and sends the response value b to AS. 
Finally, the user U and the application server AS can authenticate each other and compute the common session key 
h(K). 
 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
Guessing attacks 
These can take place either in on-line or offline mode. 
In online mode, a guessed password failure by an attacker can be detected and logged, which makes this highly 
resistant. In offline mode , clients password is used only to authenticate  clients status in message 1, which is not 
include in any data that can be verified[3]. Thus an impersonator cannot verify his/her guess on the password unless 
being aware of the random number z , which makes our protocol immune to such kind of attacks. 
 
Replay attack 
Even though an attacker can replay an old message 1 as server can not decide the freshness of a message as he will be 
unable to know the random numbers z and servers secret key to decrypt the messages received excluding this 
information which does not help in compromising a future session key or to guess the password[1]. Thus, our protocol 
is secure against message replay attacks. 
 
Efficiency of proposed scheme 
In our scheme, if a user key is revealed, an attacker can know the key shared between him and server. But still the 
server private key is secure and hence random number z is secure in message 1, message 2 cannot be decrypted since 
server’s secret key is also secure. Therefore attacker does not have any opportunity to get session keys which is what is 
required in class 1 PFS.  
 
The details are described as follows: 
 
(1) U→AS: U,{U,AS,PAU, z,gx }KS : 
 
U chooses a  z, a random number x and computes gx . Then U encrypts U,AS,PAU, z,gx by the server AU’s public key 
KS and sends the cipher text to AS. 
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PROTOCOL PROVIDING PFS WITH HIGH SECURITY 
 
U                                AU                                  AS 
 
U,{U,AS,PAU, z ,gx }Ks 
 
     
U,{U,AS,PAU, z, g
x
 } Ks,                         AS,{AS,U,SAS, b,g
y
 } Ks, 
 
 
 [U,ga ]z, [U,AS,K] KUAU 
[AS,g
b
]b, [AS,U,K] KAsAU 
 
 
[U,g
a
 ]z,[U,AU,K] KUAU, [AS,b’]K 
 
 
 
b’ 
 
 
Figure2. A protocol providing PFS with high security. 
 
(2) AS →AU: U,{U,AS,PAU, z,gx }KS,AS, {AS,U,SAS, b,g
y
 }KS : 
 
On  receiving the client U’s message, the server AS chooses a b, and computes gy mod P by choosing a random 
number y. Then, he encrypts AS, U, SAS, b, gy with the server AU’s public key KS. Both cipher texts {U,AS,PAU, 
z,gx }KS and {AS,U,SAS, b,g
y }KS together with U and AS are sent to the server AU. 
 
(3)  AU→AS: [U,ga]z, [U,AS,K]KUAU , [AS,gb]b,      [AS,U,K]KASAU : 
 
After receiving Message 2, the authentication server AU decrypts it with his private key. AU checks the authenticity of 
U by verifying U’s password PAU and the authenticity of AS by verifying AS’s secret key SAS. He then chooses a 
common key K, computes {[U,ga]z, [U,AS,K]KUAU , [AS,gb]b, [AS,U,K]KAS AU}, and transmits it to AS, where a 
and b are chosen by AU, KUAU = (gx )a = (ga)x = gxa and KASAU = (gy )b = (gb)y = gyb are used to securely pass the 
session key K.  
 
(4) AS →U: [U,ga]z, [U,AS,K]KUAU , [AS,b’]K: 
 
The application server AS first decrypts the message [AS,gb]b with b and computes KASAU = (gb)y = gyb. He then 
decrypts [AS,U,K]KASAU with KASAU and gets the common key K. Then, AS uses b’ encrypts AS, b’ with the 
common key K and sends [U,ga]z, [U,AS,K]KUAU , [AS,b’]K to the client U. 
 
(5) U→AS: b’: 
 
The client U decrypts the message [U,ga]z with z and computes KUAU = (g
a)x = gxa. Then, he decrypts [U,AS,K]KUAU 
with KUAU and gets the common key K. After that, he decrypts [AS,b’]K, checks the validity of K, and sends the 
response value b’ to AS.On account of this, the client U and the application server AS can authenticate each other and 
compute the common session key. 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS AT THE SERVER SITE 
 
 Guessing attacks 
The client’s password is not used in this protocol[2]. This leads to data that can not be verified to make sure whether 
the guess is right or wrong. This makes  our protocol immune to password guessing attacks. 
 
 Replay attacks 
The server can not decide the freshness of the message still future session keys or password from servers reply can not 
be compromised. Thus, our protocol is secure against message replay attacks. 
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 Class 7 PFS 
Our protocol is based on the following well known hard problems which cannot be solved in polynomial time. A 
problem which cannot be solved in polynomial time is believed to be unsolvable. Even if keys related to client, 
application server and authentication server are all known by an attacker, session key cannot be obtained by an 
attacker due to the complexity of the calculation process. Therefore our scheme provides class 7 PFS. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a distributed environment the client access services on application server through an authentication server. All the 
keys related to them are vulnerable to attack by an attacker. Depending upon preserving the clients, the application 
server and authentication servers keys have introduce several classes of perfect forward secrecy which are resistible to 
password guessing and replay attacks which makes them best while working in a distributed environment. 
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